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Light Infantry
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Early Light Infantry Concept and Units
Light Infantry - Infantry trained to fight in skirmish or open order, as well as in close order. Variously designated voltigeurs, jäger, or rifles.
Although there had been 'light troops' in the British Army in the 1740s, such as the Highlanders at Fontenoy (1745), it was the colonial war between France and England in North America which established the concept of 'Light Infantry' in the British Army. In the North American Wars of the 1750s, the heavy equipment, conspicuous red and white uniforms and close formation fighting of the British Army proved to be wholly unsuitable when operating in close country against Indians and French colonists, who had highly developed fieldcraft and marksmanship skills. Prompted by these experiences, General James Wolfe and Lord Amherst realised there was a need for a new approach in the Infantry. A small corps of 'Light' troops, recruited from the settlers, was formed in 1755. It consisted of specially trained men, carefully selected for their toughness and intelligence, able to scout and skirmish, concentrating and dispersing with great stealth and speed. Their dress, equipment and tactics were adjusted to meet this new role. So effective were these 'Light' troops that steps were taken to increase the number available. Regiments formed 'Light Companies' of soldiers specially selected for their toughness, intelligence, military skills and ability to act on their own initiative, within the framework of a broad tactical plan. The bugle horn, which subsequently became the emblem of light troops, replaced the drum as the means of communication for the often widely dispersed Light Companies. By the end of the 18th century it was not unusual for commanders to group the various Light Companies together for specific tasks. The invasion of Spain by Napoleon in 1802 was to cause a further, rapid evolution of the Light Infantry concept der the leadership and training of the brilliant young general, Sir John Moore. In 1968 The Light Infantry was formed as a large regiment the merger of: The Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry, The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry and The Durham Light Infantry.
The Royal Americans - 60th of FOOT
"After the devastating defeat of General Braddock at the Monongahela in 1755, the British government authorized the raising of a regiment of four battalions, recruited in Germany, and among the Swiss and German settlers of Pennsylvania and Maryland, for service in North America. This regiment was designated the 62nd Regiment of Foot. In 1757 it was redesignated the 60th (Royal American ) Regiment of Foot. Probably no stranger unit ever carried the "Royal". During 1756 - 1763 it's personnel were roughly one fourth assorted Americans, over one-half unwanted yard birds drafted out of Ireland, and the rest miscellaneous Germans , Poles, and Bohemians. The 60th still was recruiting in Germany in 1767. It included volunteers - allegedly "Germans" - from among French prisoners of War, and sergeants, corporals, invalids, and apprehended deserters from the 50th and 51st of foot. The battalions varied greatly. Skilled in European partisan warfare and quick to adapt it to American conditions, Bouquet made his 1st Battalion into light infantry specially trained for forest warfare. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were little different from average British infantry. Prevost's 4th Battalion was a military madhouse. Prevost himself was universally despised for his ignorance, insolence, and brutality, but could not be disciplined because he was
Cumberland's protege. The 60th served in all the important campaigns from 1757 on. It's 2nd and 3rd Battalions were at the surrender of Louisbourg and Quebec, the first at the capture of Fort Duquesne and in the Carolinas. During 1763, scattered garrisons of the Royal Americans met the first shock of Pontiac's Rebellion; in 1764 they had a share in it's final quelling. Seven years of wilderness campaigning had left the whole regiment half - mutinous, with many desertions.
The regiment remained in America until 1775, when it was transferred to the West Indies. Being a royal regiment, the 60th had blue facings. Unlike other British regiments, however, the enlisted men's uniforms were without lace until sometime after 1763. There is no known contemporary picture of the Royal Americans for 1755 - 1760; and details of their uniform such as the grenadier caps, must be reconstructed from the Royal Warrant of 1751. Deserter descriptions in New York and Philadelphia newspapers frequently mention leather breeches and red waistcoats; this combination may have been a summer service uniform. Brown canvas " marching gaiters " were common wear, white qaiters being reserved for full dress. Officers wore silver lace. The uniform coat could be worn with its lapels buttoned back, or closed across the chest. Bouquet at least, adopted articals of frontier dress for his battalion. In 1758, it apparently wore hunting shirts and Indian leggings. The next year a letter from one of his subordinates states"...our people have leggings. I intended always they should have been blue, but we could not have blue at Albany, so that we have green tied with a red garter. Originally the 60th was issued"....3741 long land service Musquets of the King's Pattern...deemed serviceable but not fit for regular regiments." After the peace of 1763 all light infantry units disappeared from the British army in favor of the tactics of Frederick the Great (Rogers, p 73). Later, after the 60th became the famous Royal Rifle Corps, many myths developed around its service in America, for example, that it wore green uniforms and was armed with rifles. In fact, it remained basically a red coated infantry until after 1813."
The 80th Regiment of Light Infantry
The 80th was formed in the winter of 1757 - 1758 as a result of the British commanders determination to develop a "Regular Army" type of a Ranger skilled force to emulate Rogers' Rangers' ability to compete equally with their savage foe in the French and Indian War. Rogers' Yankee command of Rangers was most debilitating to the English command and it was hoped that Gage's 80th could replace them. The nucleous for the Ranger skilled officers for the 80th were from Roger's Rangers' Cadet Company . This company was the Ranger school for the following Lieutenants in the 80th: Thomas Drought, and William Irwin from the 44th; William Fraser a Scot volunteer from the 42nd Highlanders; Nicholas Ward from the Royal Americans and to become the most famous, was William Dunbar, kin to General Abercromby and a close friend to Major Robert Rogers. All became Lieutenants in the 80th and imparted their Ranger training to their platoons in an attempt to put them on a par with their Indian foe in forest warfare. The proof of their Ranger instruction ability- for some of their non-commissioned officers, as well as officers, became reknown:
One sergeant led four of the 80th into Ticonderoga to be the first in to snatch the Frenh colors left flying above the abandoned fortress in 1759. Corporal Cauley of the 80th was the first British regular to gape at the wonder of Ausable Chasm in the Adirondacks, but later on the same mission of espionage was forced to give himself up to French on the St. Lawrence river to avoid starvation. Sergeant Lewis with his Ranger trained Lieutenant William Dunbar and a mini-platoon of their 80th, established the highlight of their regiment's history when they served in Major Rogers' St. Francis Raid expedition. Sergeant Lewis was the only member of the 80th to survive Dunbar's last Stand on October 15, 1759, when Dunbar's separated party from Rogers in the return march was overrun by the French. After a brave stand with Dunbar and Rogers' Rangers, when Dunbar and the others of the 80th fell, Sergeant Lewis managed to escape and led a few surviving Rangers from the Massacre, and after surviving many ordeals, managed to eventually reunite with Rogers on the Connecticut River rendezvous. Other units of the 80th served with scouts and missions with Rogers' Rangers to hurry their absorbtion of Ranger's tactics: Rogers with a force of 80th and Rogers' Rangers drove the French and Indians from the Island Narrows on Lake George on July 12, 1759.
To clear the way for his advance on Montreal Amherst sent Lieutenant Merideth and six men of his 80th on a secret mission up the Chazy River to scout the possibility of sending a party to destroy the Indian town of Caughnewaga across from Montreal. In spite of the original English motive for raising the 80th so that Rogers' Rangers could be disbanded, English Commanders in Chiefs soon realized, though grudgingly, that Rogers' Rangers were indispensable and instead of being reduced, Major Robert Rogers' command of Rangers were increased to double the size of Gage's 80th, much to the chagrin of Gage."
The Uniform of the 80th
"The cost of their uniforms became a necessary individual charge for the newly commissioned officers and especially for the six entries from the Cadet Company of Rogers' Rangers. For them, it became a double hardship for they had to foot the cost of their Ranger uniforms while serving as a Ranger Cadet. Now they had to purchase their 80th Light Infantry officer's uniforms. The customary red uniforms of other English Line Regiments which they wore in their original regiments, (44th, 48th and 42nd Highlanders) as Volunteers before entering Rogers' Cadet Company were not apropos, for the uniform of the 80th was Dark Brown short Coats with Dark Brown Linings. No Lace on the Coats. Buttons were black. Other clothing consisted of Waistcoats and Breeches red. Leggings Brown. Stockings and Shoes. Flannel shirts, "Capps"of Black leather."
See Silcox, James H. Jr. Rogers and Bouquet: The Origins of American Light Infantry. Military Review 1985 65 (12)
REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY
REGIMENTS and CORPS
of the BRITISH ARMY 1759-1763
Re-enactors - last checked 0306:
Royal Americans.com
Fort Michilimackinac Garrison of The 1st Battalion of The Royal American Regiment of Foot
60th Foot - Michilimackinac & Detroit Garrison
80th Foot - Gage's Light Infantry - 1st ranging Company
CMH's ARMY LINEAGE SERIES,INFANTRY Part I:
...An understanding of the internal organization of the Continental infantry regiments and their components requires a short explanation of infantry tactics in the eighteenth century. To begin with, the heart of a battle as fought in western Europe was the line of infantry. It was this line which had to be broken if victory were to be won; hence the heavy fire of the artillery and the maneuvers of the cavalry were chiefly directed against it. It was common in Europe for the battle line to be formed on an open plain just outside of effective artillery range of the enemy. This meant that the two lines took their positions within 500 yards of each other, a distance at which, with modern firearms, few men would be left standing. This is the fact which makes it hardest for moderns to visualize early warfare. The effective range of the musket of the period was not over 100 yards and was often nearer 50. Fighting at such ranges, infantry organization was founded upon the need to form the line, control it in battle, renew it when decimated, and maneuver it so as to place the enemy at a disadvantage. But this was not the beginning and the end of infantry tactics, particularly in the rough, wooded terrain of North America.
In the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, the need had grown for infantrymen to precede the battle line. Their purpose was to screen the advance or retreat of their own main body, to break up the power of the volley from the enemy's line, and otherwise to soften that line for an assault with bayonets. Such an assault commonly began at a distance of fifty yards or less from the foe. As a result, one of two things took place: either a savage hand-to-hand encounter, or a collapse and retreat by one of the lines, In any case, the infantrymen who moved out ahead of the line were trained to aim at individuals, to protect themselves by using cover, and to operate with an interval of several yards between them. They came to be called "light infantry." In contrast to their action, the line fired by volley without taking individual aim, remained standing unless ordered to do otherwise, and advanced with the men in it actually elbow to elbow up to the moment of the assault.
In the American service, as in the British, battalions and regiments were usually one and the same. An English regiment had ten companies in it, eight of them (the "battalion companies") for the line, the other two for special uses. These were the elite or "flank companies." One called the "grenadier company" was composed of men picked for their strength acrd courage. As often as not (for instance, at Bunker Hill) the grenadier companies were detached from their regiments and used together in provisional grenadier battalions. These were given the most difficult assignments, and the posts of honor (that is, of greatest danger) if used in the battle line. The tenth company in a British battalion was called the "light company." Light companies were also detached and consolidated into provisional battalions, but as often they were assigned a truly light mission, that is, to advance ahead of the line, screen it, and demoralize the enemy. This mission of light infantry in the American service was usually performed by rifle units (see Rifle Regiments)
) which fanned out in front of the army and, with their accurate fire, galled the enemy severely. At first there was no counterpart to flank companies in the Continental infantry. Beginning in August 1777, however, General Washington directed that 108 men and 9 officers be drawn from each brigade and formed into a temporary Corps of Light Infantry. When winter came this corps was disbanded, but. it had proved so useful that Washington urged Congress to authorize one light company for each battalion to be formed into a separate corps during every campaign thereafter. It was with the Light Corps, which resulted, that Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point on 16 July 1779 in the most celebrated night attack made by Americans during the Revolution. Like the British Grenadiers, the American Corps of Light Infantry became the elite body of the Army. Command was eagerly sought in it by the most enterprising officers and places in the ranks by the men. Although the Corps as a whole continued to be disbanded each winter and raised afresh for every campaign, one light company became permanent in each Continental battalion after mid-1780. Prior to that time American battalions had contained only eight companies, those of the line, so that the addition brought the total up to nine, still one short of the British. The Corps of Light Infantry received special training in the use of the bayonet. During July 1780 it was put under the command of Lafayette, and made the chief American assaults the following year upon the enemy's works at Yorktown...
OK! enough; return me to Ranger History
World War II:
Several types of light infantry were also extensively tested. One was specialized for jungle action. This type, embodied in the regiments of the 71st Light Division, never had a chance to prove itself in combat. It had not shown to very good advantage in training; hence it was converted to standard infantry in the early summer of 1944. In consequence, it was the ordinary doughboy who, beginning in the fall of 1942, did the jungle fighting in the Southwest Pacific. Another specialized type was organized for use in mountains. It was embodied in the regiments of the 10th Mountain Division, which, unlike the jungle division, enjoyed a brief opportunity to practice its specialty. The 10th Division reached Italy late in 1944 and took part in the fight. Its arrival, however, did not preclude many other infantry outfits from having to fight in the mountains the best way they could.
Revival:
The British action in the Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and our recent success in Grenada confirm that credible forces do not always have to be heavy . . . It is important for all of us to recognize the
geo-strategic value, as well as the battlefield utility, of the light infantry division concept.
-General John A. Wickham, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army, White Paper, 1984
Following the successful British display of "light infantry" prowess by the Paras and Royal Marines, a concerted effort was made by General Wickham and his successors to oversee the greatest buildup of light infantry forces since World War II.
"Major Scott McMichael (wrote) that there (were) two points of view on
this issue. First, the traditional U.S. point of view (was) that light infantry is light in organization and equipment for the purpose of achieving strategic mobility. Second, the European view (was) that light forces have a philosophy and mindset that make them unique. Their tactics are different and their style appears to be more self reliant than conventional or mechanized infantry." -
Light Infantry: The Multi-Spectra Force AUTHOR Major Lance D. Jordan, USA
See the definitive study : by McMichael, Scott R.,Major,USA. "A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry." Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., September 1987.
http://www.statecraft.org/chapter13.html
"The army's role in the Rapid Deployment Forces was performed largely through light infantry divisions, formations that had been phased out in 1944 but were revived for "their rapid deployability as a show of force."48 The new units appeared to be designed both for a real flexing of U.S. muscle (a la Grenada) and as an ostentatious signal that a new era in overseas operations had begun. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham described the rapid deployment of light infantry as a means to demonstrate the United States' "resolve and capability," particularly in scenarios where there are "low to mid-intensity conflict threats" and a U.S. presence may well "prevent the outbreak of war." Wickham stressed both the strategic value and the "battlefield utility" of "highly deployable, hard hitting combat units."
Yet, as quickly as they were constituted in the 1980's, however, light infantry forces (were) reduced as part of the Army's drawdown in the 1990's
Deployments to Somalia and Haiti by the 10th Mountain Division:
"Light Fighters Story at http://www.outsidethewire.net/abdi%20house%20raid.htm
"Perhaps nowhere has the utility of light forces been showcased better than in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), from Fort Drum, New York, was originally tasked as only one unit in a larger invasion force ordered to wrest control of Haiti from its military dictators. But because of successful negotiations, its mission changed at the last minute-and for the third time in as many years the division found itself participating in a military operation other than war. Although it had not trained specifically for peacekeeping duties in Haiti, the division's inherent flexibility allowed it to change its mission without problem and successfully complete the assignment. The division's success in Haiti exhibited the usefulness of light forces, but it also showed how far the light infantry concept has evolved, especially in combat service support (CSS)......
Early doctrine for light infantry units emphasized the need for rapid deployment: light infantry divisions were to be quickly airlifted into operational areas using no more than 500 C-141 sorties or their equivalents. Equipment for any follow-on heavy forces would be transported by sealift.......As the equipment of light infantry divisions becomes more complex and the missions assumed by these versatile units continue to broaden, the evolution of CSS units must also be examined to ensure that the proper balance between rapid deployment and organizational capabilities is maintained. As combat units quickly deploy to operations throughout the world, we must continue to ensure that the logistics tail properly supports the force. Even with its many unique challenges, the success of Operation Uphold Democracy shows that it can be done. - Changes in Light Infantry Logistics by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew T. Chmar
1996:
http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB41/
During previous confrontations with light forces in various theaters and conflicts, U.S. light infantry typically did the brunt of the work while air power played an important and sometimes decisive supporting role. In most situations, friendly ground forces--or air liaison officers located with them--detected and identified ground targets for attacking aircraft....Recent advances in detector technologies and data processing have combined to make sensors vastly more capable than those of the past. Originating primarily in DoD programs to detect armored vehicles, many of these technologies have great potential against light infantry as well. Foliage-penetrating radar, hyperspectral image processors, and advanced thermal imagers would be especially effective on intelligence-gathering airborne platforms.....the use of multiple sensors is the key to achieving robust performance and obtaining acceptable probabilities of detection and identification under varied tactical conditions. Placing such sensors on the same airborne platform would be especially effective, because it would enable operators to look at a target in several different ways before it disappeared from view.Advances in data-fusion software and in multispectral sampling suggest that it will be possible to produce a composite image of targets within seconds or minutes. By quickly providing commanders with a reliable multi-dimensional portrait of the battlefield, this composite-image approach should enable U.S. forces to identify and attack hostile targets when they are most vulnerable.
2001: Afghanistan! Operation Anaconda
The Debate Continues
http://www.g2mil.com/Apr2002Letters.htm
"Chris Louviere - "If every time we as a military have been beaten on the battlefield by light infantry soldiers with no armor or high tech equipment, why is it we think that piling on more armor and more high tech equipment is going to help us out? There is a definite patternhere. Korea, hordes of Chinese Infantry and we have a stalemate. Vietnam, well disciplined, trained, and motivated light infantry lacking the most rudimentary field equipment that we take for granted ... Somalia, hordes of untrained...undisciplined Somalis with cell phones and dime store RPGs acting as uncoordinated light infantry ...I can't help but ask myself why we don't just train our light infantry to fight theirs?
Ed: America can produce excellent light infantry, but firepower saves lives. In all these conflicts we got a kill ratio of something like 10 to 1. Even still, when you start to get large numbers of casualties the American people want to know why we are there. The politicians use the "fighting for freedom" line for while, but it never holds up, so we pull out. This reminds me of Vietnam expert John Paul Vann upsetting people during the Vietnam War. General Westmoreland was assuring everyone we would win because of our 10 to 1 kill ratio. Vann would point out that North Vietnam has five million able bodied men who could fight. At that time the US had suffered around 25,000 killed, so to kill 5,000,000 North Vietnamese soldiers we should expect 500,000 more American dead in order to win. After 50,000 dead, the American people forced our government to just let that unbalanced domino fall over"
Recent US Army Light Divisions:
6th Infantry Division (Light)
The 6th Infantry Division (Light) was activated on April 16, 1986. The 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska)(activated in 1963) served as a nucleus of the 6th Infantry Division. The Division had two active brigades and a reserve round-out brigade. During the 6th Infantry Division's inactivation in July 1994, the 1st Brigade was inactivated at Fort Richardson and activated at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. The 1st Brigade 6th Infantry Division (Light) was redesignated the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) April 17, 1998. http://www.wainwright.army.mil/1bde/d-history.htm
7th Infantry Division (Light)
In October 1985, the 7th Infantry "Bayonet" Division was resurrected as the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at its old post, Fort Ord, California. The Lightfighters of the Bayonet Division were called to Honduras in 1988 for "Operation Golden Pheasant" and to Panama in 1989-90 for "Operation Just Cause." In August 1993, part of the Division was reassigned to Fort Lewis and subsequently deactivated in June 1994 at Fort Ord. The 7th Infantry Division was reactivated on June 4, 1999, at Fort Carson, Colorado, as the first Active
Component/Reserve Component division. http://www.carson.army.mil/7ID/7ID.htm
10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
The Division was officially reactivated on February 13, 1985, at Fort Drum, New York as the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). The division commander after reactivation was Brigadier General William S. Carpenter. The 10th was the first division of any kind formed by the Army since 1975 and the first based in the Northeast US since World War II. The 10th Mountain Division (LI) was designed to meet a wide range of worldwide infantry-intensive contingency missions. Equipment design was oriented toward reduced size and weight for reasons of both strategic and tactical mobility. Operations: Desert Shield/Storm 1990-1991 Although the 10th didnt deploy to Southwest Asia as a unit, about 1,200 10th Mountain Division soldiers did go. Hurricane Andrew Relief - Florida 1992 Somalia 1992-94 Operation Restore Hope - December 1992 to May 1993. Operation Uphold Democracy - Haiti 1994-95 The Division formed the nucleus of the Multinational Force Haiti (MNF Haiti) and Joint Task Force 190 (JTF 190) in Haiti during Operation Uphold Democracy. The MNF-Haitiwas the US led coalition force in Haiti which included soldiers from 20 nations. Morethan 8,600 of the almost 21,000 troops in Haiti wore the 10th Mountain Divisionpatch. At 0930 hours, on 19 September 1994, the Divisions 1st Brigade conducted the Armys first air assault from an aircraft carrier. This force consisted of 54 helicopters and almost 2,000 soldiers. They occupied the Port-au-Prince International Airport. This was the largest Army air operation conducted from a carrier since the Doolittle Raid in World War II, where Army Air Force bombers were launched off of a carrier to attack Tokyo.
http://www.drum.army.mil/history/drumhistory.htm
25th Infantry Division (Light)
In 1985, the 25th Infantry "Lightning" Division began its reorganization from a conventional infantry division to a light infantry division. The four primary characteristics of this new light infantry division were to be: mission flexibility, rapid deployment and combat readiness at 100 percent strength with a Pacific Basin orientation. Major configuration changes included the addition of a third infantry brigade, an additional direct-support artillery battalion and the expansion of the combat aviation battalion to a brigade-sized unit. With the transfer of large quantities of heavy equipment, the 25th Infantry Division earned the designation "light" - the reorganization was completed by October 1, 1986.
http://www.25idl.army.mil/DivHistory.cfm
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